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V A L U A T I O N S F O R D I R E C T P R O P O S I T I O N A L L O G I C 
In (1969) a subsystem of classical propositional logic - called direct logic 
since all indirect inferences are excluded from it - was formulated as a 
generalized sequential calculus. With its rules the truth-value (true (t) or 
false (0) of the consequent can be determined from the truth-values of the 
premisses. In this way the semantical stipulations are formulated construc-
tively as in a calculus of natural deduction, i.e. semantics itself is a formal 
system of rules. The rules for propositional composita define an extension 
of basic calculi containing only truth rules for atomic sentences. The sen-
tences provable in the extensions of all basic calculi, i.e. in the proposi-
tional calculus itself, are the logically true sentences. The principle of bi-
valence is not presupposed for the basic calculi. That it holds for a specific 
calculus - and then also in its propositional extension - is rather a theorem 
to be proved by metatheoretic means. 
In this approach a semantics in the usual sense, i.e. a semantics based 
on a concept of valuation, has no place since the calculus of direct logic 
itself is already conceived of as a system of semantical rules. Nevertheless 
it is of some interest to see that there is an adequate and intuitively plau-
sible valuation-semantics for this calculus. 
The language L used in what follows is the usual language of proposi-
tional logic with — i , A and n> as basic operators.1 A classical or total 
valuation of L is a function V mapping the set of all sentences of L into 
{t, f} so that K ( - i A) = t iff V(A) = f, V(A A B) = t iff V(A) = V(B) 
= t. In classical logic is definable by —\ and A ; so these two truth 
conditions suffice. Partial valuations V that only map a subset of the set 
of sentences of L into {t, f} can be defined in a number of ways. Following 
K . Fine in (1975) we cut down this number by the following principles. 
We write 4 4 V(A) = u " for " V is not defined for A 44 V(A) * u " therefore 
means that V(A) = t or V(A) = f. 
(I) If V(At) * u for all 1 < i < n and C is a propositional operator, then 
V(C(AU An)) * u and V(C(AU An)) = V (C(AU An)) for 
each total valuation F 'wi th V{At) = V(Ai) for all i . 
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Fine calls this the Principle of Fidelity. It says that the classical interpreta-
tion of propositional operators is to be retained. (I) implies the following 
truth conditions: 
(a) If V{A) = f then V(~i A) = t. 
If V(A) = t then V(~n A) = f. 
(b) If V(A) = V(B) = t then V(A A B) = t. 
If V(A) = fand V(B) =(= u, or V(B) = fand V(A) 4= u then 
A fi) = f. 
If we define for partial valuations V and V: 
D E F I N I T I O N I. Vis an extension of F - for short V (> iff for all 
atomic sentences A V(A) =t= u implies P'(A) = V(A)y 
we can state a second important principle, that of Stability, thus: 
(II) If V> F a n d + u then V'(A) = V(A) for all sentences A of L . 
From this we obtain: 
(a') If V(-n A) = t then V(A) = f. 
If V(-i A) = f then K ( ^ ) = t. 
(b') If A B) = t then K(/4) = K(£) = t. 
If V(A A B) = f then K(i4) = f or V(B) = f. 
This means: If there are extensions of V that assign A different truth-val-
ues, V(A) must be indeterminate; a compound sentence cannot be deter-
minate if its truth value classically depends on that of one of its parts and 
that part is indeterminate. 
As a third postulate we take Fine's Principle of Maximal Definiteness: 
(III) If C is an «-place propositional operator V(C(Au An)) is to be 
defined whenever that is possible according to (II). 
The second condition in (b) may then be strengthened to: If V(A) = f or 
V(B) = f then V(A A B) = f. In this way we arrive at the usual concept 
of a partial valuation: 
D E F I N I T O N 2. A partial valuation of L is a function V mapping a subset 
of the sentences of L into {t,f} so that 
(1) A) = t iff F ( ^ ) = f. 
V(i A) = f iff F ( ^ ) = t. 
(2) A B) = t iff V(A) = K(£) = t. 
A 5) = f iff K(,4) = f o r = f. 
The inferences valid in all partial valuations are that of minimal propo-
sitional logic. N o sentence is true in all such valuations. For instance, 
A ZD A cannot be true in a valuation V for which V(A) = u according to 
(II). Intuitively, however, we would regard this sentence as true since 
ADA will be true in any precisification of V that makes A true or false. 
A D A is true whatever A means, and therefore we are inclined to regard 
A D A as a logical truth. This idea suggests that we employ supervaluations 
as introduced by B. van Fraassen in (1970). If Sv is the set of all total 
extensions of V, then SV(A) = t/f iff for all V'in Sv V'(A) = t/f. This 
approach, however, is not satisfactory for the following reasons: 
1. Supervaluations are not recursively defined. But it is a fundamental 
principle of semantics that the meaning of a compound expression is de-
termined by that of its parts. 
2. We cannot assume that every partial valuation has a total extension. 
If r is Russell's set, for instance, r e r cannot be regarded as either true or 
false. A n d the sentence " A is vague" would be false in every total valua-
tion, and therefore in every supervaluation. 
Fine has generalized van Fraassen's approach. His supervaluations are 
sets 5 of 3-valued valuations (with u as third truth value). On S a partial 
ordering is defined by < and the F i n 5are recursively defined in the sense 
of modal logic by reference to the V in S with V > V. The following 
definition is based on this idea: 
D E F I N I T I O N 3. A D-valuation of L is a triple SR = </, S, Vs) such that: 
(1) / is a non-empty set of indices. 
(2) For all / e / S, is a subset of / such that 
(a) i e St 
(b) jeStAkeSj^ke S( 
(3) For all / e / V{ is a function mapping a subset of sentences of 
L into {t, f} so that 
(a) If j e St then Vj > Vh 
(b) Vi fulfills the conditions (1) and (2) of D2. 
(c) Vi(A 3 B) = t iff for all j e S{ Vj(B) = t if Vj(A) = t. 
Vt(A => B) = f iff Vi(A) = t and = f. 
It is easily seen that for D-valuations we then have: If j e St and Vi(A) 4= 
u then Ky(v4) = Vt(A) for all sentences A of L . A l l K, are partial valuations 
with the sole exception that A ^> B now is not defined by —i (A A ~n B). 
V((A B) = t is not equivalent with ^ ( ^ ) = f or V^B) = t; ^ =^£) 
= t can hold even if V{(A) = u and V((B) =# t. Especially we now have 
Vi(A =3 ^ ) = t for all / and all D-valuations. 
^-valuations do not just assign truth values to sentences but also define 
inferential relations between them. For all meaning relations between 
atomic sentences of the type: " I f Au Am are true and Bu Bn are 
false then C is true (false)," the set of the extensions Vj of V{ in a D-
valuation can be so determined that these sentences / l i A .. A > l m A n 
Bi A .. A I Bn ^> ( i )C come out true in /. By a suitable choice of / and 
the Vj in SR we can therefore capture all meaning relations - or penumbral 
connections, as Fine calls them - between the atomic sentences of L , just 
as we can distinguish analytic truths in intensional semantics by a suitable 
choice of the set of possible worlds. The concept of a /^-valuation, then, 
results if we start out from partial valuations based on the principles of 
Fidelity, Stability and Maximal Definiteness and interpret implications in 
such a way that we can state all relations between truth values of sentences 
with them. This definition of the operator 3 is in accordance with Fidelity, 
for i f Vi(A) =N u * Vt(B) V^A^B) = t iff V{(A) = f or Vt(B) = w. 
Evidently it is possible to restrict the concept of a Z)-valuation in such 
a way that there is an index / 0 in / with S,-o = / (all Vj are then extensions 
of Vio), or that j e St is a partial ordering with j e 5, A / eSj =3 / = j\ or 
that Vj > Vi implies j e S„ without altering the resulting logic. As usual 
we say that a sentence A is satisfied by a ^-valuation 9M = </, S, V} iff 
Vi(A) = t for all / e / ; that A is D-true iff A is satisfied by all D- valuations; 
that an interference Au ..., An B is Wl-valid iff Vi(Ai) = .. = Vi(An) 
= t implies V((B) = t for all / e I; and that the inference is D-valid iff it 
is valid in all D valuations. 
If we call a Z)-valuation = <Z, S, V) complete iff there is a je I such 
that Vj is a total valuation, then for every complete ^-valuation there is 
a total valuation V'for which V'(A) = Vio (A) for all sentences A with 
Vio (A) =(= u, and vice versa. This also holds for completable ^-valuations 
9K, for which there is ay e / with Vj(A) 4= u for all sentences A. A therefore 
is classically true iff no completable ^-valuation satisfies —i A. 
We now want to show that the ZMrue sentences are exactly those that are 
provable in direct logic. This logic may be stated in the form of a calculus 
D* with the following axioms and rules: 
A X I O M 1. A ZD (B ZD A) 
A X I O M 2. (A ZD (B ZD O) ZD ((A ZD B) ZD (A ZD O) 
A X I O M 3.-} A ZD (A ZD B) 
A X I O M 4. A ZD (-1 B ZD - I {A ZD B)) 
A X I O M 5a. -i (A ZD B) ZD A 
b. - l (A ZD B) ZD - i B 
A X I O M 6. A ZD -i-i A 
A X I O M 7. i - i A ZD A 
A X I O M 8. A ZD (B ZD A A B) 
A X I O M 9a. A A B ZD A 
b. A A B ZD B 
A X I O M 10a. \ A ZD i (A A B) 
b. - l B ZD - I (A A B) 
A X I O M 11. (-1 A ZD C) ZD ((-IBZDQ ZD((-I(A A B) ZD C)) 
R U L E 1. A, A ZD B h B. 
In D* A ZD A is a theorem, and with it the deduction theorem may be 
proved in the usual way. 
The soundness of D* with respect to D-valuations is easily shown. A l l 
axioms of D* are ZMrue, and with Rule 1 we obtain only Z)-true sentences 
from ZMrue premisses. 
For the completeness proof we need the following stipulations and defi-
nitions: If 95 is a set of sentences, 93 h A holds iff there is a finite subset 
93 ' of 93 from which A is derivable. 93 is consistent iff not all sentences are 
derivable from 93. 
D E F I N I T I O N 4. A set of sentences 33 is called regular iff 
(a) If 93 h A then A e 93. 
(b) I f - I (A A B) E 93 then -iAe®or-iBe<B. 
(c) 93 is consistent. 
D E F I N I T I O N 5. A D-system is a pair S = <I, W> such that: 
(a) / is a non-empty set of indices. 
(b) For all / e / % is a regular set of sentences. 
(c) For all sentences A, B and all / e /: i f A z> 5 is not in % there 
is a7 e / with % c SR,., ^ e <R; and not 5 e 9*,. 
We first prove two lemmata: 
L E M M A 1. Every consistent set of sentences 93 from which A is not de-
rivable, can be extended to a regular set 93 ' not containing A. 
Proof. Let - 1 (B A C)U ~I (B A C ) 2 , . . . be a denumeration of all 
sentences of L of the form —i (B A C) . We set 930 = 93, 
93„ u { ) (B A C ) w + i 
hold, 
93 ^ { I (B A C ) H + 1 3 
93„ otherwise. 
I B} i f 93„, ) B \— A does not 
C} i f 95n, —i Ä h ^ , but not 93„, 
93 ' is to be the union of the sets 93„, and 93 ' the consequence set of 93 
93 ' is then closed with respect to derivability in D*. We have then: 
(1) For no n 93„ h- A. This holds for n = 0 according to the condition 
of lemma 1, and i f not 93„ h A then not 93„+1 h A in view of the definition 
of 93„+i, for i f 93rt, i B h A does not hold neither does 93„, {—i (B A 
C ) „ + 1 => - i B} h A. 
(2) Not 93 ' h /4. Otherwise there would be a finite subset 93 + of © 'with 
93 + h i4. But if « is the greatest number such that —I (B A C)„ + I D H Ä 
o r n (5 A C)„+i 3 —I C is in 93 + , we would have 9 3 „ + 1 \- A in contra-
diction to (1). A , then, is not in 93 ' and therefore 93 ' is also consistent. 
(3) If I (B A C)n+1 e 93 ' then - i B e 93 ' or - i C e 93 '. For either ~ i 
(5 A C)„+i 3 - i B or —I (B A C)„ + i =3 —I C is in 93„ + 1 and therefore 
in 93 ' and therefore —i Ä o r n C in 93' since 93 ' is closed. Or 93„, —\B\-
A and 93„, —\ChA. But then 93„, —i (B A C) h ,4 according to Axiom 
11 and the deduction theorem, and therefore 93 ', —I (B A C)n+l f- A. In 
view of (2) this is incompatible with —i (B A C ) n + 1 G93, however. 
93' therefore is regular and in view of its construction 93 c= 93'. 
L E M M A 2. If A is not provable in D* there is a Z)-system </, 5R> and an 
/ 6 / such that A is not in % Q . 
Proof. Let 91/ be the empty set, which is consistent and from which A 
is not derivable according to the assumption in Lemma 2. 2 As in Lemma 
1 we extend 9*/ to a regular set % 0 from which A is not derivable. For 
every sentence B 3 C not in % 0 let 91/ be the set %0 u { B } J , t f f i h C 
cannot hold, for otherwise % 0 h B ^ C and therefore B 3 C e %0. 
9?/, then, is a consistent set from which C is not derivable. It is extended 
to a regular set 9?7 according to Lemma 1, and so forth. If / is a set of 
indices for all the sets 9?, we obtain in this way, </, 9?> is a Z)-system and 
A is not in % Q . 
The completeness of D* can now be proved in the following way: If A 
is not a theorem of D*, there is a Z)-system </, 9?> and an index i 0 e 7 
such that A is not in % Q . For all i G I we define sets 5, and functions V( 
by 
(a) j e Si iff 9*, c 
(b) = t iff 5 e 91, 
Kj(fi) = riff* —I Bs %, for all sentences B. 
Then </, 5, Vs) is a D-valuation. By (a) conditions (2a,b) from Definition 
3 are satisfied, and also condition (3a). By (b) this also holds for (3b)-(3c): 
B) = t iff - i B G 91, iff Vi(B) = f. 
Vi(-i B) = f iff I I B G 9?, iff B G 9?, (cf. A6,A7) iff Vi(B) = t. 
Vi(B A C) = t iff B A C G % iff C G 91, (cf. A8,A9) iff = 
Vic) = t. 
K£(Ä A C) = f i f f- I (5 A C) G i f f - i Be%ovce % (in view of the 
regularity of % and Axiom 10) iff V((B) = f o r K,(C) = 0-
If Vi(B 3 C ) = t then B ^ Cs %. If7 e 5, then according to (a) B z> C 
G If Kj(5) = t and therefore 5 G<R, then C e in view of Rule 1 and 
the closure of 9? ;, hence V}{C) = t. 
If, on the other hand, for ally G S( and V}{B) = t we have K / C ) = t, 
we also have C e 9*, in case of B e Then B 3 C must be in 9t, and 
therefore V^B => C) = t, for otherwise there would be a j such that 
% c and not C e 5R,. 
Vi(B 3 C) = f iff-I (B ID C) e % iff B, - i C e % (cf. A4,A5) iff Vt(B) 
= t and V&C) = f. 
9JJ = </, S, K>, then, is a ^-valuation, and since y4 is not in %o Vio (A) 
=1= t, i.e. does not satisfy A. 
For the direct version of predicate logic the completeness proof is much 
more complicated - mainly because \/y(A [y] => /\xA [x]) and \Jy(~i / \ .x 
y4[x] => — l /4[v]) are not theorems of this logic. The structure of the 
valuation-concept that fits direct logic, however, already becomes suffi-
ciently clear from the propositional case. 
N O T E S 
1 The completeness of the system of operators {—i, A , z>} in the framework of direct logic 
has been proved in (1969). 
2 We cannot set ${f0 = {—i A} or 9?JO = {A 3 —i A} for these sets may be inconsistent as 
the cases of A = B v - i B and A = (B => C) z> (B ID - i B) v C shown. 
R E F E R E N C E S 
Fine, K.: 1975,, 'Vagueness, truth, and logic', Synthese 30, 265 300. 
Fraassen, B. van: 1970, 'Presuppositions, supervaluations, and free logic, in K . Lambert 
(ed.), Philosophical Problems in Logic, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, 67-91. 
Kutschera, F. v.: 1969, 'Ein verallgemeinerter Widerlegungsbegriff für Gentzenkalküle', Ar-
chiv f. math. Logik und Grundlagenforschung 12, 104-118. 
Manuscript received 5 January 1982 
